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Abstract: This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries
involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory ﬁsh stocks.
We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on ﬁsh-
ing eﬀorts by means of games in partition function form. Furthermore, we
demonstrate that the modiﬁed Shapley value is an appropriate device for the
division of the gains from cooperation.
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1 Introduction
The oceans’ ﬁsh stocks have been exploited as never before. Most of the
world’s marine ﬁshing areas have already reached their maximum potential
for ﬁsh captures (UN, 2002). FAO (2000) shows that about 47 to 50 percent
of marine ﬁsh stocks are fully exploited and are, therefore, producing catches
that have either reached or are very close to their maximum limits, with no
room for further expansion. Another 15 to 18 percent are overexploited and
there is an increasing likelihood that catches from these stocks will decrease,
if remedial action is not taken to reduce or revert overﬁshing conditions.
The world catch of marine ﬁsh has continued to rise in spite of exten-
sions of ﬁsheries jurisdictions (Exclusive Economic Zone or EEZ) in the
mid-1970s to 200 miles, though at a slower rate. To regulate the exploita-
tion of the ocean’s ﬁsh stocks further, several international agreements have
been concluded. The relevant international law was codiﬁed, developed and
enhanced through, inter-alia, the entry into force of the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea in 1994, the adoption of the Convention on Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in 1995 (abbreviated as 1995
1We thank Henk Norde for valuable and helpful comments.
1UN Fish Stocks Agreement), and the adoption of the FAO Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries in the same year. Moreover, an international ju-
risprudence on ﬁsheries related issues is slowly emerging through the work
of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (for details see Green
Paper, 2001).
The 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement calls for those nations who wish
to participate in the harvesting of the ﬁsh resources in the high seas, but
are not currently members of the relevant Regional Fisheries Management
Organization (RFMO), to declare a willingness to join and to enter into
negotiations over mutually acceptable terms of entry. Under the terms of the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is of direct relevance to the 1995
UN Fish Stocks Agreement, coastal states (CSs) and distant water ﬁshing
nations (DWFNs) shall apply the precautionary approach to conservation,
management and exploitation of straddling and highly migratory ﬁsh stocks
in order to protect the living resources and preserve the marine environment.
In addition, all states are obliged to take conservation and management
measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high
seas (Article 117). Moreover, international cooperation and negotiations are
required for all states involved in the exploitation of such resources (Article
118).
Although the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement entered into force on 11
December 2001 (UN, 2002), the precise meaning of the provisions describing
these obligations is not clear nor the manner in which they will be applied.
For example, Article 63 expresses that the states concerned should seek to
agree on conservation measures applicable beyond the EEZs, either directly
or through appropriate RFMOs. Article 64 requires that coastal and other
states whose nationals ﬁsh in the region “shall cooperate” directly or through
appropriate international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation
and optimum utilization. Furthermore, Article 118 on high seas stocks,
referring to the need to establish RFMOs, provides that states exploiting
such stocks or diﬀerent ones in the same area “shall enter into negotiations”
with a view to taking the measures necessary for the conservation of the
living resources concerned.
Due to inter alia its ambiguities, the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement
provides little or no guidance as to how cooperation, through a RFMO,
is to be eﬀected (Munro, 2000). The lack of cooperation has resulted in
conﬂicts between coastal states and distant water ﬁshing states (Bjφrndal
and Munro, 2003)2. Moreover, overexploitation has continued and the need
2According to these authors, the inadequacies of Part VII, section 2 (Articles 116-120),
2for a cooperative management regime is evident.3
The literature on the economic analysis of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks
Agreement notes that the new member or participant problem is one of
the most important problems in the high seas ﬁshery management (Kaitala
and Munro, 1993 and 1995; Bjφrndal and Munro, 2003), since the interests
of current members of the RFMO and of the applicants are often strongly
opposed: the current members face the likelihood of having to give up a
portion of their present quotas to the newcomer, and the applicant believes
that it may be better oﬀ by staying outside of the coalition and continuing
harvesting while facing fewer constraints. According to Kaitala and Munro
(1997), the likelihood of achieving stable cooperation will be very low if the
new member problem is mishandled. In addition, Datta and Miraman (1999)
show that with an increasing number of countries, the ineﬃciency of the
noncooperative equilibrium generated by the common access feature of high
seas dominates and overharvesting increases. Although the nations involved
in a regional ﬁshery resource often recognize an advantage in cooperative
management of the resource, on-going negotiations over harvest allotments
often have proven to be arduous and frustrating, and interrupted by brief
but astonishingly violent ’ﬁsh wars’.
This paper examines how a RFMO might successfully achieve eﬀective
control of a high seas ﬁshery in the context of partial cooperation. We
consider the high seas ﬁshery stock as common property and assume that
all nations are allowed to exploit it. We view concluding a Regional Fishery
Agreement (RFA) as a game, where countries freely decide whether or not
to join a coalition (i.e. a RFMO)4. That is, we consider a management
situation where a coalition of countries, say S, cooperate and where one or
several groups of countries stay outside S. The coalition member of S will
coordinate their inputs so as to maximize their incomes. However, coalition
S’s income will be aﬀected by a negative externality due to the input of
those who do not belong to S.
T h eq u e s t i o nt h a tw ed e a lw i t hi nt h i sp a p e ri st h ef e a s i b i l i t yo fp a r t i a l
cooperation and its impacts on ﬁshing eﬀorts. Moreover, we analyze how
to allocate property rights among ﬁshing nations that have expressed an
of the UN Convention pertaining to the management of high seas ﬁsheries are the source
of the lack of cooperation and conﬂicts.
3For a review of the history of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement as well as its
implementation, see Bjφrndal and Munro (2003).
4For related applications of cooperative game theoretic approaches to high seas ﬁshery
management, see, for example, Li (1998), Lindroos (2000), Bjφrndal et al. (2000) and
Pintassilgo (2002).
3interest in sustainable exploitation of a ﬁsh stock in a partial cooperative
setting. Particulary, we examine the feasible allocations of property rights
among members of a given RFMO and coalitions of potential entrants.
In this paper, the feasibility and impacts of partial cooperation are an-
alyzed by means of games in partition function form. This class of games
was introduced in Thral and Lucas (1963) and is a generalization of charac-
teristic function form games. The partition function form game allows the
complements to split into coalitions in an arbitrary manner, while the clas-
sical characteristic function form game is deﬁn e di nt e r m so fc o a l i t i o n sa n d
their complements only. We apply the modiﬁed Shapley value as a device
for the division of the gains from partial cooperation. We observe that the
emphasis in this paper is on the cost function rather than on the production
function.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the ba-
sic model and introduces notations and deﬁnitions. Section 3 analyses the
eﬀects of partial cooperation in terms of ﬁshing eﬀorts. Section 4 demon-
strates that the modiﬁed Shapley value is a feasible solution concept for
RFMOs. Concluding remarks follow in the last section.
2 The model and deﬁnitions
We begin by specifying a static model5 of a common ﬁshery resource as a
n-person game (c.f. Funaki and Yamato, 1999; and Cornes and Hartley,
2000). Let N = {1,2,...,n} be the set of n ﬁshing nations, with generic
element j ∈ N.L e te =( e1,e 2,...,en) be a vector of ﬁshing eﬀorts, where
ej ≥ 0i sc o u n t r yj’s ﬁshing eﬀort, and let eN =
Pn
j=1 ej be the aggregate
ﬁshing eﬀort of all countries.
We introduce the production function f(eN)t h a ts p e c i ﬁes the amount
of ﬁsh caught for each value of the total eﬀort eN. We assume that eﬀort as
input is homogenous and that all countries are equally likely to catch a ﬁsh
per unit of eﬀort. This implies that the share of the total harvest obtained
by country j is directly proportional to the share of country j’s eﬀort in
total eﬀort eN. In other words, the harvest of country j is given by
ej
eN f(eN)
for a given ﬁsh stock6.
Diﬀerent levels of technology eﬃciency among countries are represented
5T h a ti s ,w ea s s u m eas i t u a t i o nw h e r et h eﬁshing nations choose across diﬀerent possible
steady states, ignoring the transitional dynamics.
6Note that the distribution of ﬁsh is not a result of negotiations among ﬁshing countries;
it is simply a reﬂection of the dependence of harvesting on its eﬀort level ej and eN.
4by the cost functions cj(ej). Normalizing the price of the resource to unity,




f(eN) − cj(ej), (1)
where πj(0,0,...,0) = 0.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption A1: f(.) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, f00(.) < 0 (i.e.
strictly concave for eN > 0)7, and f(0) = 0.
Assumption A2: cj(.) is continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing and con-
vex for every j.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that cj(ej)=cjej, where cj > 0f o r
every j ∈ N.
Assumption A3:0<c j <f 0(0), for every j ∈ N
This assumption guarantees the existence of an interior solution.
For every e =( e1,e 2,...,en), and i ∈ N we deﬁne e−i =( e1,...,ei−1,e i+1,...,en).
In a similar vein, a vector e =( e1,e 2,...,en) is written as e =( ei,e −i).
The above assumptions imply that the beneﬁt function (1) is continu-
ously diﬀerentiable and strictly concave on ej. Particularly, the biological
constraints that the beneﬁt function is decreasing for eN large enough is met
• Av e c t o ro fe ﬀort e∗ =( e∗
1,e ∗
2,...,e∗
n)i ss a i dt ob eacompetitive equi-
librium or Nash equilibrium (NE) if ∀i ∈ N, and ∀ ei ≥ 0
πi(e∗
i,e ∗
−i) ≥ πi(ei,e ∗
−i), (2)
where e∗
i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N.
The assumptions A1-A3 guarantee the existence of a competitive equi-
librium. Moreover, this equilibrium is unique (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
in Watt, 1996).
7This assumption implies that the additional catch from an extra unit of eﬀort will
clearly decrease as the total eﬀort expended increseases, i.e. there are decreasing returns
to ﬁshing eﬀort.
5In addition to the above mathematical assumptions (A1-A3), we make
the following behavioural assumptions A4-A5.
Assumption A4: a country is free to enter or leave a coalition. When a
country defects from a coalition defectors either play as singletons or form
a new coalition.
Assumption A5: when countries coordinate to form a coalition, their
objective is to maximize the aggregate beneﬁt, given the strategies of the
others.
We introduce the following notions and deﬁnitions that will be used to
analyze partial cooperation.
• A coalition structure, κ, is a partition of the set N of countries. Let
P(N)b et h es e to fa l lp a r t i t i o n so fN. So, a coalition structure κ ∈
P(N)m e a n st h a tκ = {S1,...,Sm},N⊇ Sj 6= ∅, Sj ∩ Sk = ∅, for all
j,k =1 ,...,m, j 6= k and ∪m
j=1Sj = N.
For a given κ ∈ P(N), let |κ| denote the cardinality of κ (i.e. if κ =
{S1,...,Sm} then |κ| = m). The partition which consists of singleton coali-
tions only, κ = {{1},{2},...,{n}}, is denoted by [N] whereas the partition
w h i c hc o n s i s t so ft h eg r a n dc o a l i t i o no n l yi sd e n o t e db y{N}.
• Ap a i r( S,κ) which consists of a coalition S and a partition κ of N to
which S belongs is called an embedded coalition.
Let E(N) denote the set of embedded coalitions, i.e.
E(N)={(S,κ) ∈ 2N × P(N)| S ∈ κ}.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A mapping
w : E(N) −→ R
that assigns a real value, w(S,κ), to each embedded coalition (S,κ) is called
a partition function. The ordered pair (N,w) is called a partition function
form game.
The value w(S,κ) represents the payoﬀ of coalition S, given that coalition
structure κ forms. For a given partition κ = {S1,S 2,...,Sm} and a partition
function w,l e tw(S1,S 2,...,Sm)d e n o t et h em-vector (w(Si,κ))m
i=1.
6It will be convenient to economize on brackets and suppress the commas
between elements of the same coalition. Thus, we will write, for exam-
ple, w({i,j,k}, {{i,j,k},{l,h}})a sw(ijk,{ijk,lh}), and w({ikj},{lh})a s
w(ijk,lh). The set of partition function form games with player set N is
denoted by PFFGN.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Let (N,w) be a partition function form game and κ ∈
P(N).





(ii) a coalition structure κ ∈ P(N)i sa feasible structure if all coalitions




w(i,[N]), for all S ∈ κ
A feasible coalition implies that the worth of its members is at least as
much as their worth under the stand-alone structure. In a similar vein, a
coalition structure is feasible if the worth of each coalition in the coalition
structure is at least as much as its stand-alone worth. A feasible coalition
structure for a given game (N,w) is called a partial cooperation.
Example 2.1 Consider the game (N,w), where N = {1,2,3,4}, the
players are identical and w is given as follows.
w(i,[N]) = 3,w (i,{i,j,N\{ij}} =2 ,w (i,{i,jkl})=3 ,
w(ij,{ij,k,l})=4 ,w (ij,{ij,kl})=5 ,w (ijk,{ijk,l})=1 0 ,
w({N})=1 1 .
In this example, every coalition formed by 3 players such as {i,j,k}, has
w(ijk,{ijk,l}) ≥ w(i,[N]) + w(j,[N]) + w(k,[N]), while the value for a
s i n g l e t o ni nt h i sc o a l i t i o ns t r u c t u r ei s
w(l,{ijk,l})=3=w(l,[N]).
For every coalition consisting of 2 players, we have two cases:
(i)i f κ = {ij,kl} then w({ij},κ) <w ({i},[N]) + w({j},[N]),
(ii)i fκ = {ij,k,l}} then w({ij},κ) <w ({i},[N]) + w({j},[N]) and
w(i,{i,j,N\{ij}} =2<w (i,[N]).
In addition, w({N}) <
P4
i=1 w(i,[N]).
Hence, feasible coalition structures are: {i,jkl}.
7Deﬁnition 2.3 A solution of PFFGN is a function Ψ which associates
with each game (N,w)i nPFFGN av e c t o rΨ(N,w) of individual payoﬀsi n
RN,i.e.Ψ(N,w)=( Ψi(N,w))i∈N ∈ RN.
We now turn to the case that some countries agree to form a coalition
S, S ⊆ N. Since countries have diﬀerent technologies, and each country is
free to enter or leave a coalition, we consider the case in which cooperation
among countries is possible in term of transferable technologies8 (c.f. Norde
et al. 2002). This implies that the cost function of coalition S, cS(.), is the
cheapest cost function which is available among members in their coalition,
i.e.





j∈S ej is the total eﬀort of S.
Suppose that a coalition structure κ = {S1,S 2,...,Sm} is formed (m ≤
n). Total eﬀort for an admissible coalition structure Si in κ is denoted by




f(eN) − cSi(eSi), (4)
where e−Si =( eS1,...,eSi−1,e Si+1,...,eSm)
• A non-negative vector e∗ =( e∗
S1,e ∗
S2,...,e∗
Sm) associated with coalition
structure κ = {S1,S 2,...,S m}, is called a competitive equilibrium under
coalition structure κ (or equilibrium under κ) if for all i ∈ {1,2,...,m},
and eSi ≥ 0
πSi(e∗
Si,e ∗
−Si) ≥ πSi(eSi,e ∗
−Si). (5)
Note that if m = n, then (5) is the deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium, and
if m = 1 then it presents Pareto eﬃciency.
The existence of a unique competitive equilibrium under a given coali-
tion structure is obvious since the strategy sets are 1-dimensional and the
m−person game with payoﬀ functions (4) is obtained9 from the n−person
game with payoﬀ functions (1).
We are now in a position to deﬁne the ﬁshery game in partition function
form.
8For example, cooperation may lead to an exchange of vessels or labor among coalition
partners.
9The assumptions A1-A3 still hold for this game.
8Deﬁnition 2.4 A ﬁshery game in partition function form (FGPFF) is
an ordered pair (N,π), where N is the set of players and π is the partition
(beneﬁt) function derived from competitive equilibrium e∗ under κ such that
π(Si,κ)=πSi(e∗
Si,e ∗
−Si)f o ra l l( S,κ) ∈ E(N), (6)
with πSi(e)d e ﬁned by (4).
The set of ﬁshery games in partition function form with player set N is
denoted by FGPFF N.
Let κ(Si) denote a coalition structure κ, where Si belongs to. Note that
π(Si,κ)m a yd i ﬀer from π(Si,κ0) since there exist many coalition structures
which a coalition Si may belong to, while the equilibria under coalition
structures κ and κ0 are diﬀerent (c.f. there is a presence of externalities).
In the remainder of this paper, we use the notations π(i,[N]) and π(Si,κ)
to denote the payoﬀ of a single coalition {i} in the Nash equilibrium and
the payoﬀ of a coalition Si under coalition structure κ, respectively.
3 Implications of partial cooperation
In this section we analyze various impacts of coalitions and coalition struc-
tures. For each coalition structure κ = {S1,S 2,...,S k}, let e∗(κ)b et o t a l
eﬀort associated with κ, i.e. e∗(κ)=
Pk
j=1 e∗




the unique competitive equilibrium under κ. Let π(e∗(κ)) =
Pk
j=1 π(Sj,κ)
be total net rents or beneﬁts associated with κ at equilibrium e∗(κ), where
π(Sj,κ), deﬁned by (6), is the net rent of coalition Sj under κ.
Without loss of generality, we assume that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn. Thus, condi-
tion A.2 implies: 0 ≤ cn <f 0(0).
For each coalition structure κ, a straightforward result is that in the
competitive equilibrium a coalition with lower cSi has a higher ﬁshing eﬀort
level eSi.
Proposition 3.1 For every coalition structure κ, the lower the marginal
cost cSi,t h eh i g h e rt h ee ﬀort level in the coalition structure equilibrium.
That is, for every Si,S j ∈ κ, if cSi ≥ cSj then e∗
Sj ≥ e∗
Si in the equilibrium.
















From (7), it follows that




[e∗(κ)]2 [f0(e∗(κ))e∗(κ) − f(e∗(κ))].
Moreover, assumption A1 implies that
f0(e∗(κ))e∗(κ) − f(e∗(κ)) < 0
in the equilibrium under κ.10
Therefore, if cSi − cSj ≥ 0w eh a v ee∗
Si ≤ e∗
Sj.
Summing up (7), it follows that total eﬀort e∗(κ) can be determined by the
following equation:











































10Since f(0) = 0, and f
0
(x)x − f(x) is decreasing and non-positive.
10If the share of eﬀorts of coalition Sj in the competitive equilibrium under
structure κ is deﬁned by sh(Sj)=
e∗
Sj










The above equations (8) and (9) form an alternative to the proof of
Proposition 3.1 and show how to calculate total eﬀort and each coalition
eﬀort in coalition structures. Therefore, total eﬀort can be predicted by
the aggregate marginal cost and the number of coalitions k. In the following
example we will illuminate how to calculate total eﬀort and the eﬀort of each
coalition, under a given coalition structure in the competitive equilibrium.
Example 3.1 Consider four countries, indexed by i =1 ,2,3,4, with
the production function f(eN)=( 6 0− eN)eN and marginal costs c1 =2 ,
c2 =3 ,c 3 =6 ,c 4 =9 . Aggregate marginal costs, total eﬀort and total
beneﬁts as calculated by means of (8) and (9) are presented in Table 3.1.
coalitions κ
Pk
m=1 cSm e∗(κ) π(e∗(κ))
k =4 1 − 2 − 3 − 4 20 44 514
k =3 12 − 3 − 4 17 40.75 548.18
k =3 13 − 2 − 4 14 41.50 602.75
k =3 1 − 23 − 4 14 41.50 602.75
k =3 14 − 2 − 3 11 42.25 603.68
k =3 1 − 24 − 3 11 42.25 603.68
k =3 1 − 2 − 34 11 42.25 603.68
k =2 123 − 4 11 36.33 684.51
k =2 12 − 34 8 37.33 704.81
k =2 124 − 3 8 37.33 704.81
k =2 14 − 23 5 38.33 735.71
k =2 13 − 24 5 38.33 735.71
k =2 134 − 2 5 38.33 735.71
k =2 1 − 234 5 38.33 735.71
k =1 1234 2 29 841
Table 3.1. The possible coalition structures for the four countries.
Consider, for example, the case k =3w i t hκ = {12,3,4}. Aggregate
marginal cost of this coalition structure is 2+6+9 = 17.11 Since f0(e∗(κ)) =
11Observe that transferable technology within a coalition is assumed.
1160 − 2e∗(κ)a n d
f(e∗(κ))
e∗(κ) =6 0− e∗(κ), equation (8) implies that
60 − 2e∗(κ)+2 [ 6 0− e∗(κ) ]=1 7 .
Solving the above equation, the total eﬀort in the competitive equilib-
rium is obtained by e∗(κ)=180−17
4 =4 0 .75.
Substituting e∗(κ)i n t o( 9 )w eh a v e
e∗












=1 3 .25, and
e∗






Similarly for all other coalition structures.
Corollary 1 For every coalition structure κ, the lower the marginal cost
cSi, the higher the net beneﬁts in the coalition structure equilibrium.
Proof. Let e∗ =( e∗
S1,e ∗
S2,...,e∗
Sm) be a coalition structure equilibrium.
By Proposition 3.1 above, if cSi ≥ cSj, then e∗
Si ≤ e∗
Sj.M o r e o v e r , a t t h i s





Sj) − cSi · e∗


















Sj | {z }
(−)
)+e∗




Since in the competitive equilibrium
f(e∗(κ))
e∗(κ) ≥ cSi (i.e. by (7)), it follows
that π(Si,κ) − π(Sj,κ) ≤ 0.
Proposition 3.2 Let κ and κ0 be two coalition structures of a game (N,w) ∈













Proof. Let |κ| = k, |κ0| = m,a n dk ≥ m>1. Since
Pk
j=1 cSj ≤ Pm
j=1 cS
0
j and (8), it follows that
f0(e∗(κ)) + (k − 1)
f(e∗(κ))
e∗(κ)










e∗(κ) ≤ 0. (?)
Assume to the contrary that e∗(κ) <e ∗(κ0). Since
f(x)
x and f0(x)a r ed e -
creasing functions, it follows that





oreover, k − m ≥ 0. Therefore the left hand side of inequation (?)i s
positive which is a contradiction.
This Proposition shows that total ﬁshing eﬀort for a coalition structure
depends on the number of coalitions and aggregate marginal cost in the com-
petitive equilibrium. However, for a given coalition structure, the forming of
coalitions with lower total cost need not reduce the total eﬀort, while for a
given total cost, the total eﬀort increases if the number of coalitions increases
(i.e. if
P
S∈κ cS = c(κ)=c(κ0), and |κ| > |κ0|,t h e ne∗(κ) >e ∗(κ0)).12 These
results are illuminated in Table 3.1:
(i) coalition structures {14,2,3} and {123,4} have the same aggregate
marginal cost, i.e. 11, but e(3,{14,2,3}) >e (2,{123,4}).
(ii) coalition structures {123,4} and {124,3} h a v et h es a m en u m b e ro f
coalitions, i.e. k = 2, but aggregate marginal cost is 11 for {123,4} which
is larger than aggregate marginal cost 8 for {124,3}. Then the total eﬀort
e(2,{123,4}) <e (2,{124,3}).




π(13,2,4) = π(1,23,4) = (272.25,240.25,90.25);
π(14,2,3) = π(1,24,3) = π(1,2,34) = (248.06,217.56,138.06); (G3.1)
π(123,4) = (469.59,214.92);
12These results imply that the forming of coalitions will determine the situation of a
ﬁsh stock. Moreover, aggregate eﬀort under a given coalition structure depends strongly
upon how coalitions are formed by the marginal costs. For a given number of coalitions,
the coalition structure with lower aggregate marginal cost has higher total eﬀort.
13π(124,3) = π(12,34) = (427.25,277.56);
π(1,234) = π(13,24) = π(14,23) = π(134,2) = (386.91,348.20);
π(1234) = 841.
From this partition function, it follows that for the case of k =3c o a l i -
tion structure {14,2,3} is the only feasible13, while every coalition structure
consisting of two coalitions is feasible.
Observe that if countries are identical, i.e. ci = cj for all i 6= j, the
equations (8) and (9) in the unique equilibrium e∗ =( e∗
Si,e ∗
S2,...e∗
Sm)u n d e r
κ satisfy:
f0(e∗(κ)) + (k − 1)
f(e∗(κ))








Therefore, the eﬀort of each coalition only depends on the number k of
coalitions. Furthermore, for any coalition structure κ = {S1,S 2,...,Sk},
total ﬁshing eﬀort is an increasing function of the number of coalitions k,
whereas total net rents and the net rent of each coalition are decreasing
functions of k (Theorem 2 in Funaki and Yamato, 1999).14
Corollary 2 For the case of identical countries, it follows that








(ii) a coalition structure κ is feasible if the size of the largest coalition is
feasible under the equal sharing rule.




π(S,κ) for all coali-
tion structures κ
0
6= κ. Moreover, from Proposition 3.2, i.e. that ﬁshing
13This is because π(14,{14,2,3}) = 248.06 > π(1,[N]) + π(4,[N]) = 245,
π(2,{14,2,3}) > π(2,[N]) and π(3,{14,2,3}) > π(3,[N]).
14This result can be easily extended to the asymmetric case such as a reﬁnement of the
coalition structure: for a given coalition structure, the broken coalition will increase both
total cost and total eﬀort (related to the original coalition structure).
14eﬀort is an increasing function of the number of coalitions, it follows that













Si. Thus, result (i) is obtained.












Then, if countries have prudent perceptions (pessimistic expectations),







We observe that for a given coalition structure κ with k coalitions, a







all j ∈ S, where e∗(κ) is the total eﬀort in an equilibrium under κ, and e∗
N
is the Nash equilibrium. Since π(S,κ)=
f(e∗(κ))−c·e∗(κ)


















n for all Sj ∈ κ.
Example 3.2 Consider four identical countries, i =1 ,2,3,4, with
marginal cost c = 9 and production function f(e)=( 6 0− e)e. Since all
countries are identical, there are only ﬁve types of coalition structures:
κ1 = {|1|,|1|,|1|,|1|}, κ2 = {|1|,|1|,|2|}, κ3 = {|2|,|2|}, κ4 = {|1|,|3|},
and κ5 = {|4|},w h e r e|i| denotes the number of countries. The game
(N,π) ∈ FGPFFN is given by
π(|1|,|1|,|1|,|1|)=( 1 0 0 .40,100.40,100.40,100.40);
π(|1|,|1|,|2|)=( 1 6 2 .56,162.56,162.56);
π(|2|,|2|)=π(|1|,|3|)=( 2 8 9 ,289); π(|4|) = 650.25.
The coalition structures κ3 is feasible, since
π(|2|,κ3) = 289 > 2 · π(|1|,κ1) = 200.80,
under the equal sharing rule. However, a coalition with 2 players for a
coalition structure consisting of 3 coalitions is not feasible since π(|2|,κ2)=
162.56 < 2 · π(|1|,κ1) = 200.80.
154 Distribution of payoﬀs
This section considers the distribution of payoﬀs of partial cooperation that
countries can agree upon. To simplify the analyses, suppose the production
function takes the quadratic form f(e)=( b − e)e.T h ep a r a m e t e rb can be
considered a critical (maximum) eﬀort level where production cannot recover
the total cost, i.e. f(eN) ≤ c · eN if eN ≥ b, and c ∈ [mini∈N ci,maxi∈N ci].
Recall that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn. To ensure that all countries have the
possibility to catch, i.e. e∗





cn.15 The net beneﬁt function of coalition Si under coalition structure κ is:
πSi(eSi,e −Si)=( b − eN)eSi − cSi · eSi. (11)
For each coalition structure κ, the value πSi(e∗
Si,e ∗
−Si)o ft h ec o a l i t i o nSi
(under κ)i sd e ﬁned by (11) at competitive equilibrium e∗. Denote the share











l .M o r e o v e r ,l e t
π(e∗(κ)) =
P
S∈κ πS(e∗) be the total net beneﬁt.
Proposition 4.1 For every coalition structure κ, the following results hold
for every competitive equilibrium










k+1 < 0 if i = j
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Sj < 0 if i = j
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> 0 ⇐⇒ sh(Sj) < 1/(k +1 )














l e a d i n gt o( ii).




Sj)2, it follows that
15This assumption is considered as the requirement of positive shares at the equilibrium












Sj < 0 if i = j
2
k+1e∗
Sj > 0 if i 6= j
.
leading to (iii).
(iv) Since π(e∗(κ)) =
Pk













































⇔ sh(Si) < 1
k+1, which implies (iv).
Proposition 4.1 shows the relationship between marginal costs, ﬁshing
eﬀorts and net beneﬁts for coalitions in the competitive equilibrium16.T o
illuminate Proposition 4.1 consider a coalition structure κ consisting of k
coalitions (|κ| = k)a n dt h ec a s ew h e r eo n em e m b e ri leaves its coalition Sκ(i)
(∈ κ) and joins another coalition, say Sκ(j) ∈ κ.I ft h em a r g i n a lc o s tci of this
member is larger than the marginal cost cSκ(i) of its former coalition Sκ(i)
but smaller than the cost cSκ(j) of its new coalition Sκ(j), then the joining of
this member will lead to a cost reduction of coalition Sκ(j).M o r e o v e r ,t h e
marginal cost of the coalition to which i used to belong does not change.
Therefore, although the number of a new coalition structure κ0 does not
change (i.e. |κ0| = k, since only i changes coalitions), the cost structure does
change. In similar vein, (ii) and (iii) describe the impacts on coalition eﬀorts
a n dc o a l i t i o nn e tb e n e ﬁts. If own marginal costs of a coalition increase, own
eﬀorts and net beneﬁts decrease, whereas if the marginal costs of another
coalition increase own eﬀorts and net beneﬁts increase. According to (iv),
the forming of a new coalition structure may cause a reduction of total net
beneﬁti fa tl e a s to n eo ft h ee ﬀort shares is larger than 1
k+1.
The above Propositions 3.1, 3.2 and 4.1 imply that although an outcome
d e p e n d so nb o t ht h em a r g i n a lc o s tcSj and cardinality of κ, countries with
high costs have an incentive to cooperate since they will take advantage
by reducing costs when joining a coalition with lower costs. The following
example illuminates this.
Example 4.1 Consider Example 3.1. The beneﬁts of free-riding for
each coalition structure are presented in Table 4.1. The number of coalitions
16Coalitions mean both individuals and groups of individuals in a given coalition struc-
ture.
17i sp r e s e n t e di nt h eﬁrst column and the beneﬁt of each free-rider follows in
the next columns.
In Table 4.1 the second row represents noncooperative net beneﬁts. The
third and fourth rows represent free riding beneﬁts for countries i, j, i 6= j
when countries k and l form a coalition {kl}, k,l ∈ N\{i,j}. For example,
for k = 3, 272.25 and 248.06 are the payoﬀs of country 1 in the coalition
structures κ = {1,4,23} with aggregate marginal cost 14 and κ = {1,3,24}
with aggregate marginal cost 11, respectively (see Table 3.1). The last row
represents free riding beneﬁts for country i when N\{i} forms a coalition.
|κ| π({1},κ) π({2},κ) π({3},κ) π({4},κ)
k =4 196 169 100 49
k =3(free-riders with high costs ) 272.25 240.25 175.56 105.06
k =3(free-riders with low costs) 248.06 217.56 138.06 90.25
k =2 386.91 348.20 277.56 214.92
Table 4.1 The beneﬁts of free-riding.
If only two countries form a coalition (i.e. k = 3) then, relative to the
noncooperative situation a free-rider country, for example, country 4, gains
90.25 − 49 = 41.25 (84%) in the low cost cases (i.e. coalition structures
{13,2,4} or {1,23,4}), and 105.06 − 49 = 56.06 (114%) in the high cost
case (i.e. coalition structure {12,3,4}). In a similar vein, country 1 gains
248.06 − 196 = 52.06 (27%) in coalition structure {1,24,3} and 272.25 −
196 = 76.25 (39%) in coalition structure {1,23,4}.
In Example 4.1, although country 4 with the highest marginal cost has
the smallest net beneﬁt in the noncooperative situation (Corollary 3.1), it
will gain relatively more from free-riding than the other countries. For
example, consider the case of only one free-rider (i.e. k = 2). In this
situation, if countries 1,2 and 3 form a coalition {123},t h e ni nt h ec o a l i t i o n
structure {123,4} country 4 gains 214.92 − 49 = 165.92 (337%). The gains
are 177.56 (177%) in {124,3} for country 3, 179.20 (106%) in {134,2} for
country 2 and 190.91 (97%) for country 1 in {234,1}. Moreover, in coalition
structure {123,4} country 4 gains more than in coalitions with two free-
riders (c.f. {1,4,23} or {13,2,4} with gains 56.06 (114%) and {12,3,4}
with gains 41.25 (84%) for country 4).
Observe that although all coalition structures with two coalitions in Ex-
a m p l e4 . 1a r ef e a s i b l eu n d e rt h ee q u a ls h a r i n gr u l e( s e es e c t i o n3 ) ,t h et o t a l
18beneﬁts of coalition structures with two coalitions will increase if country 4
forms a coalition such that the lowest cost coalition materializes (because
it reduces the total cost of the coalition structure). For example, consider
κ1 = {12,34}, κ2 = {14,23}, κ3 = {13,24}, κ4 = {123,4}, κ5 = {124,3},
κ6 = {134,2} and κ7 = {234,1}. From the last column in Table 3.1, it
follows that17:
π(e∗(2,κ2)) = 735.71 > 704.81 = π(e∗(2,κ1)), and
π(e∗(2,κ7)) = 735.71 > 704.81 = π(e∗(2,κ5)) > 648.51 = π(e∗(2,κ4)).
In coalition structures κ4, κ5, κ6 and κ7 there is free-riding by countries
4,3,2 and 1, respectively18. The total eﬀort and total net beneﬁta r ea ﬀected
by the marginal cost of the free-rider. For example, Table 3.1 shows that if
country 1 or 2 free-rides, then total eﬀort is 38.33 and the total net beneﬁt
is 735.71. If country 3 free-rides, then the total eﬀort is 37.33 and the total
net beneﬁt is 704.81, whereas the total eﬀort reduces to 36.33 and total net
beneﬁt is 684.51 if country 4 free-rides.
The smallest eﬀort (29) and highest net beneﬁt (841) materialize for the
grand coalition only. Therefore, although there exist some feasible partial
coalition structures, the grand coalition is optimal eﬃciency.
The question arises what sharing rule of the net beneﬁts should be
adopted to stimulate the ﬁshing nations to join the grand coalition. We
propose the modiﬁed Shapley value, developed by Pham Do and Norde
(2002).19 The reason to consider the modiﬁed Shapley value rather than
the original value developed by Shapley20 (1953) is that, the latter cannot
be applied to games in partition function form such as the present game
(N,w) ∈ PFFGN, since in this class of games the contributions of each
player to the grand coalition diﬀer among coalition structures, due to the
presence of externalities among coalitions.
Pham Do and Norde (2002) show that the modiﬁed Shapley value (see
Appendix) is a unique and eﬃcient solution for a PFFGN. Moreover, they
point out that for a class of oligopoly games in partition function form such
as a (N,w) ∈ FGPFFN, where the net beneﬁt function (11) is determined





∗(2,κ6)) since the total
cost of κ2 and κ3 as well as κ7 and κ6 are equal.
18It is a reason why the full cooperation may not stable if a distribution of beneﬁts can
not be accepted by several countries.
19An alternative is the equal sharing rule. However, this rule does not take into account
the contributions of each player to the grand cooperation, whereas the Shapley value does.
20For the introduction to the Shapley value, its extensions and applications, see, for
example, chapters 53-58 in Aumann and Hart (2002).
19ley value keeps the same ordering for every player in the Nash situation.
Applying this result to a ﬁshery game in partition function form, the follow-
ing proposition is obtained.
Proposition 4.2 Let ψ be the modiﬁed Shapley value for a (N,π) ∈ FGPFFN,
where the net beneﬁtf u n c t i o n( 11) is determined in a competitive equilibrium
under coalition structures. It follows that if c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn then
(i) π(1,[N]) ≥ π(2,[N]) ≥ ... ≥ π(n,[N]),




Proof. See section 6 in Phamdo and Norde (2002).
It is obvious that stable cooperation result if ψi(π) ≥ π(i,[N]) for every
i ∈ N.
Example 4.2 Consider the ﬁshery game in partition function form
(N,π) in Example 3.1, where w is given by (G3.1). In this game, we have
π(1,[N]) = 196 > π(2,[N]) = 169 > π(3,[N]) = 100 > π(4,[N]) = 49.
Using the Appendix the modiﬁed Shapley value is obtained as
ψ(π)=( 2 7 1 .18,238.86,184.94,146.02).
Additionally, π(4,{4})=
P4
i=1 ψi(π)=8 4 1 .
The modiﬁed Shapley value allocates the payoﬀs such that the contribu-
t i o n so fe a c hc o u n t r yi nt h eg r a n dc o a l i t i o na sd e t e r m i n e db yi t sm a r g i n a l
cost are rewarded. The surplus gained from full cooperation is (75.18,69.86,
84.94,97.02). Each country has thus a diﬀerent gain in the grand coopera-
tion, due to its contribution. We observe that this distribution diﬀers from
the values that are obtained by applying other division rules such as the
equal sharing rule. For example, the transition from the noncooperative to
the cooperative situation yields the surplus 327 (= 841 − 514). The equal
sharing rule gives the outcomes (277.75,250.75,181.75,130.75), where each
player gains 81.75.
This example indicates that although the equal sharing rule can be ap-
plied for any feasible coalition structure, the modiﬁed Shapley value has
more potential to induce full cooperation.
20Finally, we observe that although each country is better oﬀ in the grand
coalition than in the competitive outcome, individual countries can do even
better by free riding under certain circumstances, as illustrated in the last
row of Table 4.1. This implies that application of the modiﬁed Shapley value
is not suﬃcient to discourage free riding. Therefor, additional measures are
needed to deter free riding; e.g. linking a ﬁshery problem to another problem
in which the players are involved (see Folmer et al., 1993 and Kroeze-Gil,
2003 and the references therein).
5 Concluding remarks
T h eo b j e c t i v eo fr e g i o n a lﬁs h e r ya g r e e m e n t si st od e v e l o pr u l e sf o rj o i n td e -
cision making to use common ﬁshery resources eﬃciently to avoid ineﬃcient
o u t c o m e s ,a n dt h ec o l l a p s eo fﬁsh stocks resulting from noncooperative be-
haviour. Furthermore, a better balance must be reached between ﬁshing
eﬀort and the quantities of ﬁsh that can be removed from the sea without
endangering the future of the ﬁsh stocks or ecosystems.
This paper has addressed the formation of coalitions smaller than the
grand coalition. Particularly, attention has been paid to the feasibility of
coalition structures and their impacts on reducing harvest levels. We have
shown that for every coalition structure in a competitive equilibrium a coali-
tion with lower marginal cost has a higher eﬀort level, and total ﬁshing eﬀort
is an increasing function of the number of coalitions. Moreover, the lower
the marginal costs, the higher the net beneﬁts in the coalition structures.
In order to induce countries to cooperate the modiﬁed Shapley value
adopted to games in partition function form has been considered. This is
a unique and eﬃcient division rule of gains from cooperation that preserves
the ordering of players in the Nash outcome. This device can be applied to
develop a proﬁt allocation scheme such as a reasonable compromise and com-
pensation for both the potential entrants and the charter members. How-
ever, allocation of the gains from cooperation on the basic of the modiﬁed
Shapley value is not suﬃcient to discourage free-riding since under certain
coalition structures the latter option may result in a higher payoﬀ than is
attainable on the basic of the modiﬁed Shapley value.
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Appendix
In order to introduce the modiﬁed Shapley value for games in partition
function form, we need some additional notations. Let Π(N)b et h es e t
of all bijections σ : {1,2,...,n} → N of N.F o r a g i v e n σ ∈ Π(N)a n d
i ∈ I([N]) we deﬁne Sσ
i = {σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(i)}, and Sσ
0 = ∅. For a given
σ ∈ Π(N)a n di ∈ I([N]), we deﬁne the partition κσ
i associated with σ and
i, by κσ
i = {Sσ
i } ∪ [N\Sσ
i ]. So, in κσ
i the coalition Sσ
i has already formed,
whereas all other players still form singleton coalitions. Furthermore, we
deﬁne κσ
0 =[ N].
Let (N,w) be a partition function form game, and σ ∈ Π(N). We deﬁne





i ) − w(Sσ
i−1,κσ
i−1).
Based on these marginal vectors {mσ(w)}σ∈π(N), we deﬁne the modiﬁed
Shapley value ψ of the partition function form game (N,w)a st h ea v e r a g e







Example Consider the partition function form game (N,w)d e ﬁned by
w(1,2,3) = (0,0,0), w(12,3) = (2,0), w(23,1) = (3,2), w(13,2) = (2,1),
w(123) = 10.
The marginal vectors associate23 with σ are:
if σ1 =( 1 ,2,3) then mσ1(w)=( 0 ,2,8)
if σ2 =( 2 ,1,3) then mσ2(w)=( 2 ,0,8)
if σ3 =( 1 ,3,2) then mσ3(w)=( 0 ,8,2)
21Further details, see Pham Do and Norde (2002).
22Observe the similarity to TU-games (c.f. Shapley, 1953).
23For example, the marginal vector of σ2 is computed as follows. As σ2 =( 2 ,1,3) then
m
σ2





w(213,{N}) − w(21,{21,3})=1 0− 2=8 . Hence, m
σ2(w)=( 2 ,0,8).
24if σ4 =( 2 ,3,1) then mσ4(w)=( 7 ,0,3)
if σ5 =( 3 ,1,2) then mσ5(w)=( 2 ,8,0)
if σ6 =( 3 ,2,1) then mσ6(w)=( 7 ,3,0).
So, the modiﬁed Shapley value ψ(w)=( 3 ,3.5,3.5).
25